Maps of Chickamauga

Map Legend

The Battle
     The Campaign
     Sept. 18th, 1863
     Sept. 19th, 1863
     Sept. 20th, 1863

Then and Now

Order of Battle

Monuments

Wargaming Chickamauga

Conclusions

Bibliography

         According to Colonel John Wilder, by about 1:00 PM “for the past hour there had been no heavy firing near us.”  He began looking for a new course of action.  With Colonel Smith D. Atkins of the 92nd Illinois he ventured to “elevated ground near Bloody Pond” to survey the battle to the north.  This was probably the rise now known as Lytle Hill, where the brigades of Lytle and Laiboldt fought earlier in the day.  From there they could see the Confederates in the fields of the Dyer farm to the north, and hear the firing from the north.
         Colonels Wilder and Atkins both agree that Wilder proposed forming the Lightning Brigade and charging through the lines to reunite with Thomas to the north.  Colonel Wilder eventually went on to write that they actually formed up for the attack, but this is not supported by either Atkins or the individual regimental reports.  The idea probably never got past the idea stage, because before Atkins could even leave Wilder’s side a newcomer met them.
         That person was Assistant Secretary of War Charles Dana.  Accounts of their meeting differ.  The story as written by Colonels Wilder and Atkins in the weeks after the battle state that Dana ordered Wilder not to attack, and to escort him to Chattanooga.  Dana’s version, written in the 1890s, specifically states that he did not have the authority to give such an order, did not ask for an escort, and rode off to Chattanooga by himself.
         Regardless of which version is correct, and it was probably Wilder and Atkin’s version, Wilder decided against making the attack.  He detailed scouts to escort Dana to Chattanooga, and set about gathering as many stragglers and wagons as he could in the area.  He also received news from the north.  From Sheridan, he learned that he could get no help from that division, and that he was alone on that portion of the battlefield.  From Lieutenant Colonel Gates Thurston of Thomas’ staff he received orders to “prolong a line” from Vittetoe’s to Lookout Mountain to enable wagons to escape via McFarland Gap.  Therefore, sometime between 4 and 5 PM, the Lightning Brigade, accompanying infantry, and wagons left the vicinity of the Widow Glenn cabin and made his way over Missionary Ridge into Chattanooga Valley.
         Could Wilder’s attack have succeeded?  Given the time necessary get troops into position and in formation, it probably would have been around 1:30 PM before an attack could have been made.  By that time most of the Confederate units would have either been engaged on Horseshoe Ridge, or resting in reserve near the Dyer and Poe farms.  If Wilder had followed the open fields of the Dyer farm, and that would have been the best avenue of attack for a mounted force, he would have ended up behind Kershaw’s Brigade, and pretty close to the forces fighting on Horseshoe Ridge.  Hood’s Division and Coleman’s brigade, resting in the woods east of the Dyer farm, could have put up resistance, but it is speculative whether they would have had enough time to deploy out of the woods and into a blocking position before Wilder had passed.  We will never know.